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s
THE POLLUTER IN BANKRU PTCY: :itNJDEPE
issued an Administrative Order and
HNotice
OBLIGATIONS THAT "RUN
THE VASTE"
new site."' Because of Torwico's failure

to take action on the seepage pit violation,

of Civil Administrative Penalty AsW ITI-Isessmenit ("the Order") on Apuil 9, 1990.17

INC. v. STATE OF N.J., DEP'T O SENVT
PROTECTION (IN RE ToRwico ELECTRoNICs, INC.) I

ToRwico ELECTRONICS,

by THEODORE A. KARDIS

leased property at a site in Ocean
owico
County,Electronics,
New Jersey Inc.
from("Torwico")
the owner,
2
George Allen Associates. Torwico manufacturedelectronictransformerseattheOcean
County site until September 1985 when it
relocated. 4
Torwico filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcys on August 4, 1989.6 Torwico's
bankruptcy schedules named the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy ("NJDEPE") as a creditor.7
The bankruptcy court mailed notice to
NJDEPE on October 4, 1989, informing it
that January 2, 1990 was the deadline for
filing a proof of claim.8
On November 13,1989, NJDEPE conducted an on-site inspection of the Ocean
County site.' The inspection uncovered a

concealed illegal seepage pit which held
hazardous wastes that NJDEPI claimedwere
migrating into local waters.' 0 Pursuant to
this inspection, NJDEPE issue-dtwo notices
of violation to Torwico for the hazardous
wastes," citing violations of New Jersey's
Solid Waste Management Act '2 and regulations thereunder.'5 Torwicc , which had
since relocated to a different site, was also
given a notice of violation for operating
withoutan EnvironmentalProt ectionAgency
("EPA") identification numbe at this new
site.14
NJDEPE did not file a proof of claim
before the January 2, 1990 deadline set by
thebankruptcycourt.'5 Meanwhile, Torwico
took no action concerning th e illegal seepage pit at the Ocean County site, although it
did acquire an EPA identificatio number for

NJDEPE assessed Torwico a $22,500 penalty for its failure to comply with the November 1989 notice and ordered Torwico to
present a written closure plan for the seepage pit.' The Order also contained a clause
which purported to exclude the obligations it
created from bankruptcy proceedings.19
In its motion for summary judgment
filed with the bankruptcy court, Torwico
contended that its obligations to the state
were claims and that they were banred by
NJDEPE's failure to meet the filing deadline.20 The bankruptcy court granted
Torwico's motion, denying NJDEPE's crossmotion for summary judgment2' NJDEPE
appealed to the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, which reversed thejudgmentofthebankruptcycourL3 2
Torwico appealed to the instant court, the
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circut.23
The Third Circuit held that NJDEPE's
efforts to compel Torwico to dean up the
illegal seepage pit, which posed a continuing
hazard, didnotconstitutea"caim"underthe
Bankruptcy Code. 24

U.

LEGAL HSTORY

ln The United States Supreme Court first

1 8 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 1993).
2 Id. at 147.
3 In re Tonwico Electronics, Inc., 131 B.R. 561, 562 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991).
4 Torwico, 8 F.3d at 147.
5 11 U.S.C. §9 1101-1174 (1988).
6 Torwlco, 8 F.3d at 147.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-1 to 1E-207 (West 1991).
13 In re Torwico Electronics, Inc., 131 B.. 561, 563 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991).
14 Torwlco, 8 F.3d at 147.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 147-48.
19 Id. at 148. The clause read as follows: "No obligations imposed [by this order] ... are intended to constitute a debt, damage daim. penalty or other civil action which should
be limited or discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. All obligations are Imposed pursuant to the police powers of the State of New Jersey, intended to protect the public health,
safety, welfare, and environment." Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 151.
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attempted a resolution of the clash between
the Bankruptcy Code and environmental
laws in the 1985 decision of Ohio v.
Kovacs.-5 The Court addressed the question
of whether certain government actions gave
rise to a dischargeable claim in bankruptcy.26
InKovacs, the State of Ohio had obtained an
injunction which ordered William Kovacs,
the chief executive officer and stockholder of
a corporation, to clean up a hazardous waste
site.' A $75,000 penalty for causing fish
kills accompanied the injunction." Subsequently, Ohio obtained the appointment of a
receiver who was instructed to dean up the
site.2' The receiver was to take possession of
the site as well as the property and assets of
Kovacs and other corporations implicated in
the lawsuit? However, the receiver was
unable to complete the clean-up before
Kovacs filed a personal Chapter 7 liquidation." TheStateofOhioarguedthatKovacs'
obligation to clean up the hazardous waste
was not a debt that could be discharged
during the bankruptcy proceeding, since it
was not even a "debt"32 In order to reach its
result, the Court construed various provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.
The Court reasoned that because a
debt is defined as "liability on a claim"-3 and

that a claim included the "right to an equitable remedy,"34 the State had such a claim,
as evidenced by the injunction it obtained
ordering the cleanup?
The State conceded that a $75,000
penalty for causing fish kills was a debt
dischargeable in bankruptcy.? Given that
the penalty was admittedly a debt, the Court
found that the logical corollary was that the
cleanup order, albeit a remedy for a statutory
violation, nonetheless also constituted a bankruptcy claim.? The Court gave the term
"claim" the broad construction it saw as
apparent from the legislative history.3'
The Court also turned to the holding of
the Court of Appeals as a justification for its
ruling. The Court of Appeals had found that
Kovacs' cleanup obligation had been reduced to a monetary obligation by virtue of
the receiver's actions. 3' The Court adopted
this holding, while attaching much significance to the fact that the receiver had divested Kovacs of both the authority and
means to clean up the site." It also noted
that subsequent to appointing the receiver,
4
the State sought only money from Kovacs. 1
The Court went on to declare what it

had not decided. By way of clarification, it
pointed out that its holding did not render

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

469 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 705, 83 LEd.2d 649 (1985).
Id.
469 U.S. at 275-6, 105 S.Ct. at 706.
469 U.S. at 276, 105 S.CL at 706.
469 U.S. at 275-76, 105 S.CL at 706.
469 U.S. at 276, 105 S.Ct at 706.
469 U.S. at 276, 276 n.1, 105 S.Ct at 706.
469 U.S. at 278, 105 S.Ct. at 707.
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988). According to § 101(5), a "claim" means:

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 278-79, 105 S.CL at 707.
469 U.S. at 279, 105 S.Ct. at 708.
Id.
Id.
469 U.S. at 282, 105 S.CL at 709.
469 U.S. at 283, 105 S.Ct at 709-10.
469 U.S. at 283, 105 S.CL at 710.
469 S.Ct. at 284, 105 S.Ct. at 710.
Id.
469 U.S. at 284-85,105 S.Ct. at 710-11.
469 U.S. at 285, 105 S.Ct. at 711.
Id.
944 F.2d 997 (2d Cr. 1991).

Kovacs immune from prosecution for either
his violations of Ohio environmental law or
42
his failure to comply with the injunction.
Likewise, the Court reserved discussion of
the hypothetical possibility that Kovacs might
have filed for bankruptcy prior to the appointment of a receiver, with the resultant
appointment of a bankruptcy trustee.43 The
Court also expressly stated that it did not
hold that the injunction against conductwhich
would cause further pollution was dischargeable in bankruptcy."' Additionally, the Court
pronounced it unquestionable that the possessor of the site must comply with state
environmental law. 45 Concluding this dicta,
the Court found it evident that a current
posessor of the site could not maintain a
nuisance, pollute the State's waters, or refuse
to remove a polluting source."
Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Kovacs, two of the United States Courts of
Appeals have addressed the issue of whether
the obligation to clean up a hazardous waste
site pursuant to an environmental injunction
survives bankruptcy. In 1991, the Second
Circuit was the first to do so in In re
Chateaugay Corp.47 Chateaugayinvolved
a debtor corporation, LTV, who filed for

(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced tojudgment, liquidated, unliquidated. fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B)right to an equitable remedy for breach of performanceif such breach gives riseto aright to payment, whether ornotsuch right to an equitable remedy is reduced
to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. Id.
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy and listed some 24
pages of "contingent" claims resulting from
its operation of hazardous waste sites.? The
creditors enumerated inthese pages included
the EPA, every state, and the District of

Columbia.49 The EPA contended that the
$32 million in already-incurred Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")50 response
costs for which it had filed a proof of claim
were just the tip of the iceberg since cleanup
was not completed at the sites it had identified and moreover it had not completed the
process of identifying all sites for which LTV
might be a "potentially responsible party"
under CERCLA. 5'
The court ruled thatan injunctionwould
constitute a dischargeable "claim" under the
Bankruptcy Code ifit imposed an obligation
to clean up purely as an alternative to an
obligation to pay." On the other hand, the
court held that an injunction which requires
the polluter to take any action that terminates or assuages current pollution is not a
"claim" under the Bankruptcy Code.0 The
court pointed out that environmental-based
injunctions often combine an obligation to
clean up existing wastes with an obligationto
end or assuage current, ongoing pollution.'
The court went on to rule that the former

obligation, as it applied to LTV and its
creditor, the EPA, was a "claim" under the
Bankruptcy Code since CERCLA gave the
EPA a right to clean up the site itself and sue
for the response costs, which immediately
transformed that portion of the injunction
into a monetary obligation." Conversely,
the court ruled that the latter of these two
obligations was not a "claim" since the EPA
had no right to a payment as an alternative
to continued pollution." In conclusion, the
court speculated that most environmental
injunctions would not constitute "claims" if
its temporal distinction was employed. 7
The next Circuit to address a similar
issue was the Seventh Circuit, which did so
in 1992 in In the Matter of CMC Heartland Partners." In CMC, the Milwaukee

Road railroad had gone through a reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of
189859 and had emerged as CMC Heartland
Partners.6 The Milwaukee Road had leased
property known as the Wheeler Pit to General Motors Corporation in 1956, which
dumped paintsludgeand coalashintothe pit
for nearly 20 years.61 Although the EPA had
knowledge of the Wheeler pit prior to the
Milwaukee Road's filing for bankruptcy, it
did not file a claim during the proceeding62
In an abatement action pursuant to § 106(a)

of CERCLA," the EPA ordered GM and
CMC to clean up the Wheeler Pit, but did not
do so until after the deadline for filing claims
inthe Milwaukee Road bankruptcy proceeding had passed."
The Seventh Circuit held that CERCLA
created a "claim" in bankruptcy at least
where it required a debtor to pay money due
to acts that had been committed before the
bankruptcy proceedings." Thus, since the
EPA had not filed a claim in bankruptcy,
CMC could not be held liable for its ownership and operation of the Wheeler Pit as the
Milwaukee Road." Nonetheless, the court
found that CMC was liable for cleanup costs
by virtue of its current ownership of the site,
which had continued after the reorganization.e The court held that CMC could be
held liable under §§ 106 and 107(a)(1) of
CERCLA68becauseCERCLAcreatesa claim
running with the land byvesting power in the
executive branch to direct a current owner to
dean up a hazardous waste site?
In dicta, the court pointed out that
CMC would have to accept the economic
responsibility for the cleanup regardless of
whether it disposed of the property or held
onto it through the bankruptcy proceeding.o The court reasoned that CMC would
"pay" for the cleanup even if it sold the

48 Id.at 999.
49 Id.
50 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. I-M 1989-91); 42 U.S.CA §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).

51 Chateaugay,944F.2dat999. Accordingto42U.S.C. §9607 (a), apotentiallyresponsiblepartyIncludes(1)theownerandoperatorofafacility,(2) theownerandoperator
of afacility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances, (3)a person who arranged for disposal or transport of their hazardous substances at afacility which contains hazardous
substances, and (4) a person who accepts hazardous substances for transport to a facility from which there is a threatened or actual release of these substances.
52 Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
59 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978).
60 CMC, 966 F.2d at 1144-45.
61 Id.at 1145.
62 Id. at 1146.
63 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
64 CMC, 966 F.2d at 1145-46.
65 Id. at 1146.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1146-47.
68 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607(a)(1) (1988).
69 CMC, 966 F.2d at 1146.
70 Id. at 1147.
MELP
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property, since the cleanup costs would be
reflected in the lower price it would have to
accept in order to sell. 7
In determining whether the EPA's ordersurvived bankruptcy, thecourtfirststated
that a statutory obligation attached to current
ownership would survive.72 The court then
identified the question as whether or not the
EPA's order was dependent on CMC's current ownership 3 To answer this question,
the court articulated the standard that the
EPA must establish that harmful releases are
threatened or ongoing.74 The court found
that the EPA had met this standard and had
avoided the conclusion that it was "repackaging a forfeited claim for damages."75
Few courts have addressed the important issue of which portions, if any, of an
environmental injunction survive a bankruptcy proceeding. The United States Court
of Appeals, Third Circuit, was the most
recent court to find itself at the crossroads of
environmental and bankruptcy law, as it did
in the instant decision.

W. THE

INsTANT DECISION

In the instant decision, the Torwico
court began its analysis by stating the principle that a debtor must comply with state
environmental laws and may not maintain a
nuisance. Concomitant with this principle,

the court reasoned that a state can compel a
debtor to comply with its laws, even to the
extent of requiring the debtor to take action
which would incur expenses, so long as it
does not require the debtor to pay money
directly to it?
The Torwico court held that the state's
Order did not require Torwico to pay money
directly to it." The court found it evident that
thestate's Orderrequiring Torwicoto present
a written closure plan for the seepage pit
constituted compelling Torwico to take action which would bring it into compliance
with state laws.79 Despite finding that no
payment of money was required by the
injunction, the court recognized the possibility that such an injunction could still constitute a "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code.80
The court proceeded to articulate two
additional tests which it would use to analyze
the possibility that the injunction was a
"claim." 8 ' First, it stated thatforan order not
to be a "claim," it must be in response to an
ongoing and continuing threat, not just a
disguised reformulation of apreviouslybarred
claim for damages.82 Second, the court
found that an order would constitute a claim
if thestate was authorized to do the cleanup
itself and sue for its costs afterwards, since
such a situation would create a breach that
gives rise to a right to payment83

After applying these tests to the facts of
the case, the court ruled that the findings of
the state's inspection met the first test."
Since the state had shown that the seepage
pit was an ongoing and continuing threat in
that it continued to leak wastes into local
waters, the Order was not merely a "repackaged claim for damages."as Moreover, the
Order passed the second test as well since it
created an obligation in Torwico to remedy
ongoing pollution, and not a right to payment in the state." Returning to the general
principle which began its discussion of the
case at hand, the court reiterated that the
state could force Torwico to comply with its
environmental laws to the extent that it was
malting Torwico remedy an existing hazard."
The court than proceeded to reject
Torwico's position that it could not be held
responsible for the cleanup since it no longer
occupied the Ocean Countysite." The court
distinguished the instant case from Kovacs
by pointing out that Torwico could conduct
the cleanup since it had access to the site and
the state had not cleaned it up either.89
Applying New Jersey law, the court found
that Torwico had an ongoing responsibility
for the wastes it had generated.9 Despite
the fact that Torwico was no longer in
possession of the Ocean County site, the

71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Torwico,8 F.3d at 150.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 150, 150 n.5.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 150-51. The court did not expressly adopt these tests, which are lifted from the CMC and Chateougaydecisions, but such an inference isreadily made from the
fact that the court stated that CMC and Chateaugaywere "both persuasive and consistent" and the fact that itwent on to utilize both tests. Id.
82 Id. at 150.
83 Id. This second test could be conceptualized as a subtest of the first, since the court prefaced it by stating that such an order would be separate from an obligation to cease
or alleviate ongoing pollution. Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 151.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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court found that it was still responsible for the
nuisance it had created since the wastes it
had generated continued to threaten the
environment.91 The court ruled that the
obligations the state's Order had created
were not "claims" dischargeable in bankruptcy.92
The court also factually distinguished
the instant decision from Kovacs. The court
pointed out that the instant decision was
unlike Kovacs since the state's Order did not
require the payment of money to the state
nor did it create a right to payment under the
applicable New Jersey laws.' 3 The court was
satisfied that the Order was not a "claim," as
the injunction in Kovacs was, since the state
was pursuing cleanup of a current pollutionproducing site.' 4 Furthermore, the state's
lack of an option to accept payment in place
of continued pollution also persuaded the
court that the Order was not a claim.9s Since
the state lacked this option, and the Order
was intended to ameliorate ongoing pollution, the court ruled that it was not a "claim"
under the Bankruptcy Code."
The court held that Torwico's obligations "raln with the waste."' 7 It reasoned
that since the waste was Torwico's and it
presented an ongoing and continuing environmental hazard, Torwico was responsible
for cleanup no matter where Torwico or the
waste might be.98 The court found it s:gnificant that the Orderwas notaddressed to past
damages, but rather to future harm caused

by Torwico's waste."
The Third Circuit concluded by summarizing its holding that the state's Order
requiring Torwico to clean up the Ocean
County site, a site which continued to pollute
the surrounding environment, was not a
"claim" for purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.W Furthermore, the court held that
the state's inherent regulatory and police
powers entitled it to issue the Order."'o

IV. ComrM
In relation to existing precedent, the
Torwico court propounds to be faithful to
Kouacs, CMC, and Chateaugay. 102 To this
extent, Torwico joins the few courts which
have decided the question of whether an
injunction requiring a debtor to clean up a
hazardous waste site survives a bankruptcy
proceeding. Faithfulness to these prior holdings was not difficult for the Torwico court to
claim, since none of them truly constrained
the Third Circuit As far as Kovacs was
concerned, the Torwico court only had to
distinguish factually the instant case in order
to escape the confines of Kovacs' narrow
holding. Once it had accomplished this, it
was free to explore the issues which Kovacs
explicitly stated it did not address.y Since
theholding of Kovacs islimitedto injunctions
which mandate the payment of money, the
Torwico court looked to CMC and
Chateaugay as persuasive authority although it was not required to.

Nonetheless, while Torwico is admittedly consistent withCMC and Chateaugay,
it breaks new ground without explicitly announcing that it is doing so. Torwico's
unique holding was that an injunction requiring cleanup is valid where the debtor is not in
possession but has access to the site and the
ability to conduct the cleanup, the debtor
generated the hazardous waste, and the
hazardous waste continues to threaten the
environment. In the words of the court,
Torwico's obligations "runwiththewaste."1os
This precedentially unique holding requires
the polluting debtor to remedy the harm
caused by the waste it has created regardless
of the debtor's location, the waste's "location" (e.g. migration onto adjacent lands or
waters), or the debtor's post-reorganization
financial condition. In comparison, the court
in CMC only held that the debtor's obligations run with the land, a considerably narrower ruling.
The policies which underlie both environmental and bankruptcy law and helped
shape the Torwico decision are weighty
indeed. On the one hand, the Bankruptcy
Code embodies the ideal of a "fresh start""os
for reorganized debtors by providing a means
of allocating pre-bankmuptcy assets to various creditors and preserving future profits
for the debtor which should save otherwise
viable businesses.xo' On the other hand,
environmental laws, whether they are state
or federal, seek to protect public health,

91 Id. The court went on to argue that Kovacs, CMC, and Chateaugayall suggested that Torwico had such an ongoing responsibility. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. See also Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008; 11 U.S.C. § 101(5XB) (1988).
97 Torwico, 8 F.3d at 151.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 150-51.
103 See supranotes 41-45 and accompanying text.
104 Torwico, 8 F.3d at 151.
105 See H.R. Rep. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5963, 5968-69,6135; Fallickv. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2nd Or. 1966).
106 See Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 1002; CMC, 966 F.2d at 1146; James K.McBain, Note, EnvironmentalImpediments to Bankruptcy Reorganizations,68 IND. U.
233, 233-4(1992).

I~

M E LP R

47

Vol. 2 * No. 1
public safety, and (obviously) the environmentL' The state and federal legislation
found in Torwico and its supporting authorities have the objective of the cleanup of
1
environmentally hazardous materials. o
When the competing policies are analyzed interactively, it is difficult to favor a
bankruptcy policy path. A rule which disallowed injunctions against ongoing pollution
by a post-reorganization debtor would have
the effect of giving the debtoraright it did not
have prior to bankruptcy. Dicta in Kouacs
stated as a foregone conclusion that the
possessor of a site, whether a debtor or its
successor in interest, cannot refuse to remedy ongoing pollution, regardless of its origins.109 It would not be just to allow the
debtor to skirt his statutory obligations by
merely transferring his possession.
Many commentators argue that the
policy goals of bankruptcy are paramount,
observing that environmental laws such as
CERCLA sometimes cause the "sudden
0
death of otherwise viable firms.""x However, this also would require the conclusion
that a debtor should be less accountable
under applicable environmental laws inside
bankruptcy than it would be outside of it.
Furthermore, the ramifications of allowing proven polluters to survive bankruptcy should be considered when the relative merits of reorganization versus compliance with environmental regulations are
compared. Ideally, the onus of statutory

fines and cleanup costs would weed out
those firms whose production-induced detriment to the environment outweighs their
benefit as a producer in the marketplace.
However, this "survival of the socially-fit"
can only be accomplished if environmental
laws retain their force through a bankruptcy
proceeding. If irresponsible firms are allowed to avoid environmental regulation by
ducking in and out of bankruptcy, these
"otherwise viable" firms would certainly be
doing more harm than good to society. The
"fresh start" policy goal of the Bankruptcy
Code must be subordinated to society's
greater interest in the preservation of public
health, safety, and the environment.
In fact, the very applicability of the
"fresh start" doctrine to Chapter 11 reorganizations is questionable."1 1 The doctrine
was originally developed to give a second
chance to individual debtors, not to bail out
inefficient or mismanaged businesses. 112 In
fact, some commentators go so far as to say
that the discharge of claims against a corporation in bankruptcy has nothing to do with
the "fresh start" doctrine.113 Instead, the
discharge has been conceptualized as an
incentive to favor reorganization over dissolution when the corporati6n's value as a
going concern significantly exceeds its liquidated assets. 114 Regardless, it is difficult to
endow this net retained corporate value with
a higher public policy status than the public
health, safety, and environmental concems

addressed by the environmental legislation.
Conceptual attempts at a resolution of
this conflict have produced a myriad of
approaches. Several theories would require
that policy-makers legislate the injunction
into a claim in bankruptcy. Some commentators suggest that injunctions should be
classified based on their dependence on a
debtor's continued existence.115 Thus, if the
pollutionwould ceasewhen the debtor ceased
to exist, the injunction would be deemed a
non-dischargeable claim.116 Conversely, if
the pollution would continue regardless of
the debtor's continued existence, it would be
a dischargeable claim.117 Such a scheme
would certainly favor bankruptcy policy considerations over environmental ones. Essentially, it would allow debtors to hide under the
veil of bankruptcy proceedings. Debtors
would emerge from bankruptcy immune
from statutory obligations related to waste
which they themselves had created; waste
that is continuing to pollute the environment.
In fact, some courts have criticized this classification scheme for its inability to cope with
the ongoing pollution fact pattem. 118
A possible alternative method of reconciling the current state of the intersection of
environmental and bankruptcy law would be
to enact legislation to give environmental
violations resulting in judgments or injunctions priority in bankruptcy proceedings.
This idea was proffered in a concurring
opinion by Justice O'Connor in Kouacs."x

107 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L REv. 1199, 1201 n.7 (1984); CMC, 966 F.2d at 1146.
108 See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
109 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285.
110 McBain, supranote 106, at 234.
111

Phillipe J. Kahn, Comment, Bankruptcy Versus EnvironmentalProtection:DischargingFutureCERCLA LiabilityIn Chapter11, 14 CAnozo L REv. 1999,2034-

37(1993).
112 Id. at 2033.

113 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganizationsand the Treatment of Diverse OwnershipInterests: A Comment on AdequateProtection
of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cn. L REv. 97, 110 n.45 (1984); THomas H. JAcsson, THE LoGIc m LAMrs oF BAmmwPrcy LAw 227 n.5 (1986).

114
115

Id. at 19G-91.
Bait supranote 107, at 1204.

116
117

Id.
Id.

118
119

Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 1007.
Kovacs, 469 US. at 286,105 S.Ct. at 711.
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However, it would be necessary to make
these judgments and injunctions "claims"
under the Bankruptcy Code. Additionally,
the problem of calculating future cleanup
costs would remain, although the tool of
claim estimation has been suggested as a
means of partially alleviating concerns about
uncertainty.12 A slightly more encouraging
proposal advocates the use of a foreseeability
approach which would release debtors from
liability to the extent that environmental
harm is foreseeable before the closure of
bankruptcy.121 While Justice O'Connor's
suggestion does promise resolution and finality in bankruptcy, a debtor going through
reorganization with meager assets could have
its environmental liabilities entirelydischarged
by the proceeding at a fraction of the cost to
be incurred by the public afterwards. Thus,

the question remains whether the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to account
for environmental concerms orwhether courts
like the one in Torwico should be left to
continue to sort out the conflict.
In comparison to the patchwork
quilt of available legislative possibilities, it
would appear that the Third Circuit has
forged a viable, if temporary, solution to the
conflicting policies advanced by environmental law and the Bankruptcy Code. By
synthesizing the teachings of Kovacs, CMC,
and Chateaugayinto an administrable sef of
tests for determining what portions of an
environmental injunction constitutea "claim"
for purposes of a bankruptcy proceeding,
the court has set an example for other
jurisdictions to follow. Until legislative reconciliation of the Bankruptcy Code and en-

vironmental law, Torwico will serve as a
model of how states can enforce their environmental laws and regulations without having enforcement hampered or destroyed by
debtors ducking in and out of Chapter 11.
Moreover, Torwico's holding that a debtor's
obligations "run with the waste" will serve to
expand the reach of environmental laws to
post-reorganization debtors that have relocated and to liability for waste that has
migrated past the boundaries of the original
hazardous waste site. Torwico is also a
reaffirmation of the ability of a state to use its
police and regulatory powers to enforce its
environmental laws.122 Torwico is important
as one of only a handful of decisions which
allow a state to force a debtor, newly emergent from bankruptcy, to remedy the ongoing pollution which it has spawned.

120 McBaln, supranote 106, at 240. The Bankruptcy Code, § 502(c), gives courts discretion in the estimation of contingent and unliquidated claims.
Id.; 11 U.S.C. §502(c)
(1988).
121

Kevin J. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liabilityin Bankruptcy* When Does a Claim Artse?,76 Me. L REv.
327,

354-361 (1991).
122 ironically, the Third Circuit has come full irde back to its decision in Penn Terra Ltd. v.Dept of Environmental Resources, Com.
of Pa.,
F.2d 267 (3d Or. 1984).
Penn Terra's holding affirmed the use and significance of a state's police power. Oddly, the court in Torwico downplayed the significance of Penn733
Terra, relegating the parties'
extensive arguments concening it to a brief discussion in note 2.
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